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Organizational Politics and Multisource Feedback:  An Opportunity or a Threat? 
 
Gary J. Greguras 
Singapore Management University 
John M. Ford 
CWH Management Solutions 
 
Despite favorable attitudes being critical to the viability of multirater systems, little is known about 
the factors that impact rater attitudes.  Results from a field study demonstrated that perceptions of 
organizational politics negatively relate to rater acceptance and cost-benefit evaluations and that 
these relationships were not moderated by one’s understanding, control, or rater perspective.  
Results indicated that supervisors held the most favorable attitudes and that experienced raters 
held more favorable attitudes than those without experience. 
 
Keywords:  Politics, Feedback, Ratings 
 
The use of multisource feedback systems (MSFS) has increased dramatically over the past several years (Church 
& Bracken, 1997).  Proponents suggest several advantages of multisource ratings over single-source ratings 
including higher quality feedback (Wexley & Klomoski, 1984), improved performance (Tornow, 1993), reduced 
biases (Bernardin & Beatty, 1984), and greater employee empowerment (Cotton, 1993; London & Beatty, 1993; 
Moravec, Gyr, & Friedman, 1993).  Although there are several potential benefits associated with MSFS, a 
prerequisite to the successful implementation of MSFS and to achieving these benefits is user acceptance 
(Bernardin, Dahmus, & Redmon, 1993; Bettenhausen & Fedor, 1997; Carroll & Schneier, 1982).  Past research 
has attempted to understand factors that influence user acceptance of MSFS by focusing on ratees (e.g., Antonioni, 
1994; Bernardin et al., 1993), with relatively little research focusing on rater attitudes towards MSFS.   
Rater attitudes likely impact the effectiveness of MSFS because raters who hold negative attitudes may refuse 
to participate, provide inaccurate ratings, or attempt to manipulate the system to secure their own self-interests 
(Fedor, Bettenhausen, & Davis, 1999).  As Antonioni and Woehr (2001) note:  “…rater perceptions have to be 
considered and addressed in order to have an MSF process that is valid, reliable, and acceptable” (p. 116).  As 
such, it is important to identify factors that influence rater attitudes regarding MSFS (Funderburg & Levy, 1997).  
One such factor may be organizational politics (cf. Bernardin & Beatty, 1984; Fedor et al., 1999).  To date, 
however, little research has investigated the influence of organizational politics on traditional performance 
appraisals (Murphy & Cleveland, 1995), and research has not examined its effects on rater attitudes toward MSFS.  
With respect to MSFS, the current study investigates whether raters perceive organizational politics as an 
opportunity or as a threat.  This research also explores whether understanding of organizational processes, control 
over organizational events, or rater perspective (i.e., supervisor, peer, or subordinate) moderates the relationships 
between organizational politics perceptions and rater attitudes toward MSFS. 
 
Organizational Politics  
 
After reviewing the organizational politics literature, Kacmar and Baron (1999) offered the following 
definition: “organizational politics involves actions by individuals, which are directed toward the goal of 
furthering their own self-interests without regard for the well-being of others or their organization” (p. 4).  There is 
a growing acknowledgment that politics play a prominent role in organizational policies and processes and likely 
influence several important work-related attitudes and behaviors.  Ferris, Russ, and Fandt (1989) note two features 
of organizational politics that should be considered when investigating its relationships with employee attitudes 
and behaviors.  First, perceptions of organizational politics are more important than reality (Ferris et al., 1989).  As 
Lewin (1936) noted many years ago, people respond to their perceptions of a situation, which may be different 
from the situation itself.  As such, perceptions of organizational politics should be the focus of politics research, 
even if these perceptions represent inaccurate depictions of the actual organizational environment (Gandz & 
Murray, 1980).  Second, organizational politics may be interpreted as either beneficial or detrimental to an 
individual’s well-being (Ferris et al., 1989).  Organizational policies and practices that are viewed as highly 
political can create situations of potential gain (i.e., opportunity) as well as potential loss (i.e., threats) (Ferris et 
al., 1996b).  Thus, organizational politics perceptions may result in differing responses to organizational policies 
and practices depending on whether politics are viewed as an opportunity or as a threat. 
  Politics as a Threat.  Kacmar and Baron’s (1999) review of the organizational politics literature concluded 
that organizational politics perceptions generally appear to be detrimental to organizations, both for individuals 
within the organization and for the organization as a whole.  Raters who perceive their organizational environment 
to be highly political may likewise perceive MSFS as a threat.  Employees in highly political situations may see 
MSFS as potentially jeopardizing working relationships, making employees feel vulnerable to retribution,  
creating a popularity contest, making coworkers overly concerned about pleasing each other, or creating a 
situation where the most productive workers are downgraded because of jealousy (Bettenhausen & Fedor, 1997).  
Fedor et al. (1999) suggest that perceptions of organizational politics within performance appraisal systems likely 
undermine user acceptance because individuals who are asked to participate in MSFS in highly political 
organizations are likely to expect negative outcomes. 
Politics as an Opportunity.  Although the research reviewed above highlights the potential detrimental effects 
of organizational politic perceptions on employee attitudes, some researchers have suggested that organizational 
politic perceptions are not always negative for the employee.  With respect to performance appraisals, 
Longenecker, Gioia, & Sims (1987) found that supervisors often provide political ratings to achieve their own 
personal goals within an organization.  When using performance ratings to achieve personal goals, raters may 
desire to project a positive image, secure organizational resources for oneself, and avoid confrontations with, or 
disapproval from, others (Murphy & Cleveland, 1995).  Similarly, raters may see MSFS as an opportunity to 
influence pay raises and to improve interpersonal relationships (Longenecker & Gioia, 2000).   In these situations, 
organizational politics perceptions may be perceived as an opportunity, rather than as a threat. 
The first purpose of the current study is to assess whether perceptions of organizational politics negatively 
(threat) or positively (opportunity) relate to rater attitudes toward MSFS.  The majority of research in this area has 
observed that organizational politics perceptions are detrimental to both organizations and individuals (Kacmar & 
Baron, 1999) and that perceptions of organizational politics are perceived as a threat to one’s well-being (Baum, 
1989).  As such, the current study hypothesizes: 
H1:  Perceptions of organizational politics will negatively relate to rater attitudes toward MSFS. 
 
Potential Moderators 
 
Understanding.  Understanding may be one mechanism by which individuals define organizational practices 
as either opportunities or threats (Ferris et al., 1989; Sutton & Kahn, 1986).  Understanding refers to knowledge 
concerning how and why things happen in the organizational environment (Kacmar, Bozeman, Carlson, & 
Anthony, 1999; Sutton & Kahn).  When understanding is low, organizational politics are likely to be perceived as 
a threat because employees will not be able to insulate themselves from negative consequences (Ferris et al., 
1989).  However, employees who understand the politics of their organizations may be able to position themselves 
to take advantage of potential opportunities, resulting in less negative affective reactions (cf. McGrath, 1976).  
With respect to MSFS, understanding is expected to influence the interpretation of organizational politics as either 
opportunities or threats.  Thus, the current study hypothesizes: 
  H2:  Understanding will moderate the relationship between perceptions of organizational politics and rater  
  attitudes of multisource feedback systems, such that under conditions of lower understanding, increases in   
  perceptions of organizational politics will be associated with less favorable attitudes than under conditions of  
 higher  understanding. 
Control.  A second factor that may influence whether individuals interpret organizational politics as 
opportunities or threats is control (Ferris et al., 1989).  Control is defined as the extent to which individuals have 
the ability to exercise influence over their organizational environment (Ferris et al., 1996b).  Individuals who feel 
high levels of control within their organization likely expect less aversive outcomes than those who feel that they 
have little control (Sutton & Kahn, 1986).  Similarly, Ferris et al. (1989) argued that when employees perceive 
high levels of organizational politics and feel that they have little control over these organizational processes, 
organizational politics likely will be perceived as a threat.  However, if employees feel that they have control over 
organizational processes, organizational politics will be perceived as an opportunity to promote their self-interests 
(Ferris et al., 1989).  With respect to MSFS, raters who perceive having control over organizational processes are 
likely to feel less threatened by the potential costs of providing ratings and have less negative reactions to MSFS 
than those who perceive having less control.  In contrast, those who perceive their organizations as being highly 
political and feel little control over organizational events are likely to focus on the costs (as opposed to the 
benefits) of MSFS and are likely less accepting of these systems than those perceiving more control.  Thus, the 
current study hypothesizes: 
  H3:  Control will moderate the relationship between perceptions of organizational politics and rater attitudes  
  of multisource feedback systems, such that under conditions of lower control, increases in perceptions of  
  organizational politics will be associated with less favorable rater attitudes of MSFS than under conditions of  
 higher  control. 
 Rater  Perspective.  The current study also investigates whether rater perspective moderates the relationship 
between organizational politics perceptions and rater attitudes.  Whereas few studies compare multiple rater 
sources within a single study (Bettenhausen & Fedor, 1997), the current study investigates supervisor, peer, and 
subordinate raters.  While research suggests that supervisors use performance ratings for political purposes 
(Longenecker et al., 1987), for several reasons peer and subordinate raters may be even more influenced by 
organizational politics.  First, research suggests that many employees feel uncomfortable and unqualified when it 
  
comes to providing performance ratings for their supervisors (i.e., subordinate raters) and peers (Bettenhausen & 
Fedor, 1997).  Unfortunately, these are exactly the types of situations (i.e., uncertain, ambiguous) in which 
political behavior is most likely to occur (Ferris et al., 1989).  Second, providing feedback is likely a riskier 
proposition for peers and subordinates than for supervisors.  That is, peers and subordinates may fear retribution or 
other negative outcomes as a result of their ratings.  Accordingly, the political implications of providing 
performance ratings are likely more salient for coworkers and subordinates than for supervisors.  Third, peers and 
subordinates may be more susceptible to ratee political behavior (e.g., ingratiation, impression management) than 
supervisors because they likely have less experience and training in evaluating the performance of their coworkers 
or supervisors, respectively.  Taken together, there are various reasons to expect that the relationships between 
organizational politics perceptions and rater attitudes will be more negative for peers and subordinates than for 
supervisors.  In combination with the rationale presented above regarding the relation between organizational 
politics perceptions and rater attitudes, the current study hypothesizes: 
  H4:  Rater perspective will moderate the relationship between perceptions of organizational politics and rater  
  attitudes of multisource feedback systems, such that for peers and subordinates, increases in perceptions of  
  organizational politics will be associated with less favorable rater attitudes of MSFS than for supervisors. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
Participants in this study were 602 full-time working adults.  Three samples were used in this research.  The 
first sample consisted of 147 participants and assessed rater attitudes concerning evaluating one’s subordinates 
(i.e., supervisor rater sample).  The majority of participants in the first sample were male (62%) and worked in 
middle-level managerial positions (50%).  The second sample included 202 participants and assessed rater 
attitudes about evaluating one’s peers (i.e., peer rater sample).  The majority of participants in this sample were 
male (52%) and worked in non-managerial positions (50%).  Finally, the third sample (n = 253) assessed rater 
attitudes concerning evaluating one’s supervisor (i.e., subordinate rater sample).  The majority of participants in 
the third sample were female (53%) and worked in non-managerial positions (43%).     
 
Measures 
 
Perceived Organizational Politics.  Perceptions of organizational politics were measured using Ferris and 
Kacmar’s (1992) 31-item Perceptions of Organizational Politics Scale (POPS).  The POPS is designed to measure 
respondents’ perceptions regarding the level of political behavior in their organizations.   
Understanding.  Understanding of organizational events was measured using Tetrick and LaRocco’s (1987) 
three-item Understanding of Events Scale (UES) and three items written for the current research.  The UES 
assesses the extent to which respondents understand the events within their work environment.   
Control.  Control over organizational processes was measured using Tetrick and LaRocco’s (1987) six-item 
Control Over One’s Work Environment Scale.  This scale was designed to measure the level of control 
respondents feel that they have over their work environment.   
Rater Acceptance of MSFS.  Rater acceptance of MSFS was measured using nine items developed 
specifically for this study.  As indicated in the appendix, three scales with parallel wording and structure were 
created to assess rater acceptance of the use of supervisor, peer, and subordinate ratings.     
Rater Perceptions of the Cost and Benefits of MSFS.  Rater perceptions of the costs and benefits of MSFS 
were assessed by Bettenhausen and Fedor’s (1997) seven-item Positive Appraisal Outcomes Scale (PAOS) and 
their 10-item Negative Appraisal Outcomes Scale (NAOS).  This scale was designed to measure the extent to 
which users perceive that positive or negative outcomes will result from the use of multisource ratings.   
Bettenhausen and Fedor created two parallel versions of this scale: one targeting peer feedback and the other 
targeting subordinate ratings.  An additional version of the scale was developed for this research designed to 
assess rater perceptions of supervisor ratings (i.e., by replacing the words “peer” with “supervisor” and 
“coworkers” with “subordinates”).  
 
Procedure 
 
Three versions of the questionnaire were developed.  Each questionnaire included measures assessing 
participant demographics, perceptions of organizational politics (POPS), understanding, and control.   
Questionnaires differed, however, in the rater source to which rater attitudes were directed.  Specifically, one 
questionnaire assessed rater attitudes toward providing supervisor ratings, another assessed rater attitudes toward 
providing peer ratings, and a final questionnaire assessed rater attitudes toward providing subordinate ratings.  So 
that participants would be representative of individuals who work for organizations in which a MSFS might 
  
realistically be implemented, questionnaires were not distributed to individuals who work for colleges or 
universities, individuals who work for organizations with less than two managerial levels, and individuals who 
work for family businesses.  Consistent with Bettenhausen and Fedor (1997), we chose to conduct this study 
across organizations because the majority of studies on MSFS have been conducted using a single organization 
thereby making it difficult to determine if the results are because of contextual factors specific to that 
organization, or whether the results would generalize to other settings. 
The questionnaires began by defining MSFS and asking participants to imagine that their current organization 
was going to implement a MSFS for developmental purposes.  A detailed description of MSFS was provided.  
Participants were then informed of the perspective (i.e., supervisor, peer, and subordinate) that they should take 
when responding to this part of the questionnaire and each perspective was defined (e.g., subordinates were 
defined as individuals who directly report to you).  Completed questionnaires were returned directly to the 
researchers via a self-addressed, postage paid envelope.  Note that our sample was comprised of working 
individuals who were asked to consider that their company would be implementing a MSFS.  We chose this frame 
of reference because, for successful implementation of MSFS, it is essential that system users believe that MSFS 
will result in positive outcomes (Bettenhausen & Fedor, 1997; Ewen & Edwards, 2001).  As Bettenhausen and 
Fedor (1997) note, these user preconceptions are a critical piece of information for practitioners deciding how and 
when to implement a MSFS.    
 
Results 
 
Development of Scales  
 
Each of the scales in the present research demonstrated acceptable levels of estimated reliability (range: α = 
.82 to α = .96).  For all samples, POPS was negatively related to understanding and control.  Past research 
investigating these variables have observed correlations of similar magnitude (e.g., Ferris, Gilmore, & Kacmar, 
1996b; Ferris et al., 1994; Kacmar et al., 1999).  It is also interesting to note that while organizational tenure 
(Ferris et al., 1994) and tenure with supervisor (Gilmore, Dulebohn, & Harrell-Cook, 1996) were used as proxies 
of understanding in previous research, job tenure was unrelated to understanding in the supervisor, subordinate, 
and combined samples (i.e., treating all raters equally) and was negatively related to understanding in the peer 
sample. 
Test of Hypotheses 
  Hypothesis 1. To test Hypothesis 1, hierarchical regression analyses were conducted.  Control variables (e.g., 
gender) were entered on the first step, and POPS was entered on the second step.  Results indicated that POPS was 
a significant predictor of rater acceptance of MSFS in the peer sample (∆R
2 = .04, ∆F(1, 183) = 8.44, p < .05), the 
subordinate sample (∆R
2 = .02, ∆F(1, 236) = 5.21, p < .05), and the combined sample (∆R
2 = .04, ∆F(1, 535) = 
23.98, p < .05) but not in the supervisor sample (∆R
2 = .01, ∆F(1, 137) = 2.03, p > .05).  POPS significantly 
predicted cost-benefit evaluations in all of the samples (supervisors, ∆R
2 = .08, ∆F(1, 137) = 12.36, p < .05; peers, 
∆R
2 = .10, ∆F(1, 183) = 21.42, p < .05; subordinates, ∆R
2 = .04, ∆F(1, 236) = 9.81, p < .05; and combined sample 
∆R
2 = .08, ∆F(1, 535) = 51.05, p < .05).  Based on these results, Hypothesis 1 is largely supported.   
 Hypothesis  2.  Results indicated that the interaction between organizational politics perceptions and 
understanding failed to account for significant incremental variance in rater cost-benefit evaluations in each of the 
independent samples (supervisor ratings sample, ∆R
2 = .00, ∆F(1, 135) = 0.59, p =.44; peer ratings sample, ∆R
2 = 
.01, ∆F(1, 181) = 1.48, p = .23; subordinate ratings sample, ∆R
2 = .00, ∆F(1, 234) = 0.26, p = .61) or  in the 
combined sample (∆R
2 = .00, ∆F(1, 531) = 2.54, p = .11).  Similarly, results indicated that the interaction term did 
not predict rater acceptance in each of the independent samples (supervisor ratings sample, ∆R
2 = .00, ∆F(1, 136) 
= 0.02, p =.97; peer ratings sample, ∆R
2 = .01, ∆F(1, 183) = 2.27, p = .13; subordinate ratings sample, ∆R
2 = .00, 
∆F(1, 236) = 0.77, p = .38).  However, in the combined sample, results indicate that the two-way interaction term 
was a significant predictor (∆R
2 = .01, ∆F(1, 541) = 8.44, p < .05).  Results indicated that the nature of the 
interaction was as hypothesized (i.e., when understanding is low, POPS is associated with lower acceptance of 
MSFS than when understanding is high).  However, given the small amount of variance for which it accounted 
(1%), and the failure to find a significant interaction in all other analyses, Hypothesis 2 fails to be supported.  Note 
that POPS had a main effect whereas understanding did not. 
 Hypothesis  3.  Results indicated that the control x organizational politics perceptions interaction did not 
account for significant variance in rater acceptance in any of the independent samples (supervisor ratings sample, 
∆R
2 = .01, ∆F(1, 135) = 0.70, p =.40; peer ratings sample, ∆R
2 = .01, ∆F(1, 181) = 2.35, p = .13; subordinate 
ratings sample, ∆R
2 = .00, ∆F(1, 234) = 0.76, p = .39) or the combined sample (∆R
2 = .00, ∆F(1, 531) = 2.15, p = 
.14).  Similar to the above results, this interaction did not account for significant variance in the prediction of rater 
cost-benefit evaluations in any of the independent samples (supervisor ratings sample, ∆R
2 = .00, ∆F(1, 135) = 
0.04, p =.84; peer ratings sample, ∆R
2 = .00, ∆F(1, 181) = 0.81, p = .37; subordinate ratings sample, ∆R
2 = .01, 
  
∆F(1, 234) = 3.16, p = .08) or in the combined sample, (∆R
2 = .00, ∆F(1, 531) = 0.03, p = .87) (see Tables 9-12).  
Hypothesis 3 fails to be supported.  Note that POPS emerged as having a main effect whereas control did not.   
 Hypothesis  4.  Results indicated that rater perspective did not moderate the relationships between POPS and 
rater attitudes (for acceptance, ∆F = 1.46, p > .05; for cost-benefit evaluations, ∆F = 2.36, p > .05).  As such, 
Hypothesis 4 fails to be supported.  Rather, results indicated that rater perspective had a main effect on both rater 
acceptance and cost-benefit evaluations of MSFS.  Follow-up tests demonstrated that rater attitudes were 
significantly more favorable for supervisors (acceptance, M = 4.28, SD = 0.46; cost-benefit evaluations, M = 3.89, 
SD = 0.46), than for subordinates (acceptance, M = 3.81, SD = 0.77; cost-benefit evaluations, M = 3.43, SD = 
0.66), which were significantly more favorable than peer rater attitudes (acceptance, M = 3.26, SD = 0.99; 
cost-benefit evaluations, M = 3.04, SD = 0.83).   
 
Additional  Exploratory Analyses 
 
Understanding × Control Interaction.  Although past research in this area generally has not investigated an 
understanding x control interaction, this interaction in rater attitudes toward MSFS was explored in the current 
study.  Although the understanding x control interaction did not account for significant variance in the supervisor 
rater (acceptance, ∆R
2 = .00, ∆F(1, 135) = 0.22, p = .64; cost-benefit evaluations, ∆R
2 = .01, ∆F(1, 135) = 0.85, p 
= .36) and subordinate rater samples (rater acceptance, ∆R
2 = .00, ∆F(1, 234) = 0.77, p = .38; rater cost-benefit 
evaluations, ∆R
2 = .00, ∆F(1, 234) = 0.51, p = .48), it did explain unique variance in rater acceptance of peer 
feedback (∆R
2 = .06, ∆F(1, 181) = 11.45, p = .001) and rater cost-benefit evaluations of peer feedback (∆R
2 = .10, 
∆F(1, 181) = 21.14, p < .001).  As illustrated in Figure 1, the nature of the interaction revealed that when 
participants’ perceptions of control were low, higher levels of understanding were associated with higher reported 
acceptance of peer feedback.  However, when reported control was high, there was a negative relationship 
between understanding and acceptance of peer feedback.  The nature of the interaction was the same for peer 
cost-benefit evaluations.   
Rater Experience.  One-way ANOVAs also were conducted to investigate whether rater attitudes toward 
MSFS differed based on participants’ prior experience with providing performance feedback ratings.  To 
determine whether participants had prior experience with MSFS, participants in each sample were asked to 
indicate whether they had ever been asked to evaluate the performance of a supervisor, peer, or subordinate.  For 
the supervisor feedback sample, prior experience with rating one’s subordinates did not significantly influence 
rater acceptance (F(1, 142) = 0.85, p = .36, η
2 = .01) or rater cost-benefit evaluations (F(1, 142) = 0.12, p = .73, η
2 
= .00) of supervisor feedback.  Note, as expected, the vast majority of supervisors reported having experience 
evaluating their subordinates (129 out of 144 reported having experience with subordinate ratings).  However, 
prior experience giving peer feedback did significantly impact rater acceptance of peer feedback (F(1, 190) = 8.31, 
p = .004, η
2 = .04) and rater cost-benefit evaluations of peer feedback (F(1, 190) = 7.13, p = .01, η
2 = .04).  
Participants who had previous experience with peer feedback reported higher levels of acceptance (M = 3.51, SD 
= 0.92) and more positive cost-benefit evaluations of peer feedback (M = 3.24, SD = 0.80) than participants 
without previous rater experience (acceptance, M = 3.10, SD = 1.00; cost-benefit evaluations, M = 2.92, SD = 
0.83).  Similarly, prior experience with rating one’s supervisor was significantly related to rater acceptance of 
subordinate feedback (F(1, 245) = 3.98, p = .047, η
2 = .02) and rater cost-benefit evaluations of subordinate 
feedback (F(1, 245) = 6.92, p < .01, η
2 = .03).  Participants who had previously been asked to evaluate the 
performance of their supervisors reported higher levels of acceptance (M = 3.94, SD = 0.73) and more positive 
evaluations of subordinate feedback (M = 3.59, SD = 0.62) than did those without previous experience 
(acceptance, M = 3.74, SD = 0.80, cost-benefit evaluations, M = 3.36, SD = 0.68).  Thus, rater attitudes concerning 
the use of non-traditional rater sources (i.e., peer ratings, subordinate ratings) were more positive for individuals 
who had previously participated in such systems. 
 
Discussion 
 
Favorable user attitudes are critical to the acceptance and viability of MSFS (Edwards, Ewen, & Vendantam, 
2001).  Little is known about rater attitudes toward MSFS or of the factors that impact these attitudes.  The current 
study investigated the relationships between perceptions of organizational politics and rater attitudes toward 
MSFS, and whether these relationships are moderated by one’s understanding, control, or rater perspective.  
Results consistently demonstrated that the perception of organizational politics negatively relates to rater 
acceptance and rater cost-benefit evaluations of MSFS.  The relationships between perceptions of organizational 
politics and rater attitudes were not moderated by one’s understanding of organizational processes, one’s control 
over organizational events, or rater perspective.  Interestingly, one’s understanding and control did not predict 
rater attitudes, whereas, rater attitudes differed based on rater perspective such that supervisors held the most 
favorable attitudes, followed by subordinates, followed by peers.  Exploratory analyses indicated that 
understanding and control interacted to predict peer rater attitudes, and that experienced raters had more favorable 
  
MSFS attitudes than those without experience. 
 
Politics as a Threat 
 
A consistent finding was that organizational politics perceptions were negatively related to favorable rater 
attitudes, suggesting that raters view organizational politics as more of a threat than as an opportunity.  These 
results raise a warning flag that, in highly political organizations, there may be potential negative effects 
associated with the less favorable attitudes.  For example, raters might resist the implementation of MSFS, might 
refuse to participate, or might attempt to sabotage the system if they perceive their organizations to be political.  
Because favorable rater attitudes are important to the effectiveness and maintenance of MSFS (Edwards et al., 
2001), interventions aimed at reducing perceptions of organizational politics (e.g., increasing organizational 
communication, formalizing organizational policies and procedures) and increasing acceptance of MSFS (e.g., 
rater training programs, MSFS orientation programs, reward systems that are consistent with MSFS, 
informational meetings with rater groups) might help facilitate the introduction and sustainability of MSFS.  
Bracken (1996) lists several factors (e.g., resources, management commitment) that likely influence an 
organization’s readiness to implement MSFS.  Our results suggest that measuring employees’ perceptions of 
organizational politics may also be useful in assessing an organization’s readiness to implement MSFS. 
In contrast to previous research which has suggested that understanding and control moderate organizational 
politics perceptions-outcome relationships (e.g., Ferris et al., 1996b; Ferris et al., 1994), the current study found 
that organizational politics perceptions were negatively related to rater acceptance and cost-benefit evaluations of 
MSFS regardless of one’s level of understanding or control.  One potential explanation for these different findings 
is that, while understanding and control may influence the opportunity/threat status of organizational politics 
perceptions in regard to general job attitudes and behaviors (e.g., job anxiety, job satisfaction), organizational 
politics perceptions may be more likely to be interpreted as threatening in the context of organizational systems 
that are traditionally tied to rewards and punishments (e.g., performance appraisal, selection and promotional 
systems).  Accordingly, understanding and control may not play as important a role in framing whether 
organizational politics are perceived as opportunities or threats in the context of performance appraisal because, in 
these situations, organizational politics are overwhelmingly viewed as a threat.  Interestingly, understanding and 
control both failed to be significant predictors of rater attitudes. 
One exception to the consistent finding that perceptions of organizational politics negatively relate to rater 
attitudes was that perceptions of organizational politics were not significantly related to rater acceptance of 
supervisor feedback.  While rater cost-benefit evaluations concerning supervisor feedback were significantly less 
positive for individuals reporting heightened levels of organizational politics than for individuals reporting lower 
levels of organizational politics, rater acceptance of supervisor feedback was not negatively impacted by 
perceptions of organizational politics.  A potential explanation for this finding is that because supervisor feedback 
is the most prevalent source of performance feedback (Murphy & Cleveland, 1995), supervisors may consider it to 
be part of their job duties regardless of whether they expect positive or negative outcomes.  Consequently, 
although supervisors in highly political organizations might expect supervisor feedback to result in less positive 
outcomes than individuals in less political organizations, these perceptions may not influence their acceptance of 
supervisor feedback because they understand that providing feedback to their subordinates falls within their job 
responsibilities and that they have no other choice but to participate in such systems.  As such, in highly political 
organizations they may accept the systems but not expect favorable outcomes. 
 
Rater Perspective 
 
The results of the current research indicate that, in general, participants reported rater acceptance and rater 
cost-benefit evaluations above the midpoint for each rater source.  However, rater source (i.e., supervisor 
feedback, peer feedback, subordinate feedback) was found to account for significant differences in both rater 
acceptance and rater cost-benefit evaluations of MSFS.  Rater acceptance and cost-benefit evaluations were most 
positive for supervisor feedback, followed by subordinate feedback, followed by peer feedback, respectively.  
Because supervisor feedback is the most common source of performance feedback (Murphy & Cleveland, 1995), 
it is not surprising that it is the most accepted form of feedback as well.  One potential explanation for the finding 
that subordinate feedback is viewed more positively than peer feedback may stem from the fact that, while 
organizations often have policies in place to protect subordinates from supervisor retaliation, policies protecting 
employees from coworker retaliation are relatively rare (Fedor et al., 1999).  Peer feedback may therefore carry 
more perceived risk.  Peers may also be less accepting of MSFS because they may be in direct competition for 
organizational resources with their peers (e.g., promotions, salary raises).  Alternatively, subordinates may be 
more accepting of MSFS (and have more positive expectations) because what a supervisor does directly impacts 
their jobs, while the performance of peers may have little personal relevance for the rater.  Thus, the results of the 
current research indicate that individuals develop separate attitudes toward each type of rater source and that 
  
attitudes toward one source may not necessarily generalize to other sources. 
 
Understanding x Control Interaction 
 
  An interesting finding of the current study was that understanding and control interacted to predict rater 
acceptance and rater cost-benefit evaluations of peer feedback.  These results indicate that for individuals who 
report high levels of control, understanding was negatively related to rater acceptance of peer feedback.   
Conversely, the relationship between understanding and rater acceptance of peer feedback was positive when 
control was low.  Individuals with low perceptions of control and high understanding of organizational processes 
may have viewed providing peer feedback as an opportunity to gain some level of control within their 
organizations.  On the other hand, those with high feelings of control and understanding may view MSFS as a 
threat to their power because these systems provide a voice to those who currently have little influence in 
organizational decisions.  Interestingly, this interaction was found in the peer sample, but not in the supervisor or 
subordinate samples.  Perhaps these issues are more salient in regard to peer ratings because the raters and ratees 
are in more direct competition for resources, rewards, and promotions than is the case with supervisor or 
subordinate feedback.   
 
Rater Experience 
 
Participants in the current study who reported having previous experience providing peer and subordinate 
feedback reported higher levels of acceptance and more positive cost-benefit evaluations for these feedback 
sources than participants without such experience.  Thus, as the use of MSFS increases, differences among rater 
sources may likely diminish.  It may be that “fear of the unknown” explains the differences between rater attitudes 
toward supervisor feedback and alternative feedback sources.  Consequently, rater acceptance and cost-benefit 
evaluations of MSFS may become more positive as raters participate in MSFS and become more comfortable with 
their roles as raters.  Accordingly, training programs designed to expose individuals to MSFS and provide 
experience making performance ratings may reduce the level of resistance among those with little familiarity with 
MSFS.  Although our findings suggest that experience has a positive effect on rater attitudes, it is likely that the 
relationships between experience and rater attitudes are moderated by type of experience.  However, this point 
again highlights the importance in assessing the readiness of the organization (Bracken, 1996) and for creating 
conducive organizational environments prior to implementing MSFS so that participants’ experiences are positive 
and translate into favorable attitudes. 
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